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Abstract. Anomalous user behavior detection is the core component of
many information security systems, such as intrusion detection, insider
threat detection and authentication systems. Anomalous behavior will
raise an alarm to the system administrator and can be further combined
with other information to determine whether it constitutes an unautho-
rised or malicious use of a resource. This paper presents an anomalous
user behaviour detection framework that applies an extended version of
Isolation Forest algorithm. Our method is fast and scalable and does not
require example anomalies in the training data set. We apply our method
to an enterprise dataset. The experimental results show that the system
is able to isolate anomalous instances from the baseline user model using
a single feature or combined features.
1 Introduction
Detecting malicious activities is an important part of an information se-
curity strategy. Attacks may come from intruders or malicious insiders.
While not every anomaly is an attack, nearly every attack includes anoma-
lous user behaviour. Effective detection on anomalous user behaviour is
therefore an important part of detecting attacks.
Many existing machine learning methods for anomaly detection re-
quire examples of both acceptable behaviour and malicious behaviour to
train the system. Finding a sufficient number of example attacks can be
a challenge, as these events by nature are relatively rare.
We propose a new method for detecting anomalies in user behaviour
based on the isolation forest anomaly detection algorithm. Our method
does not require any example anomalies in the training set. We apply our
method to an enterprise dataset of staff accessing the payroll system in a
large enterprise organisation.
In this paper, an effective anomalous user behavior detection system
has been developed. The main contributions of this paper are towards
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– We apply an extended version of Isolation Forest algorithm to isolate
anomalous user behavior. We extend the Isolation Forest algorithm
to support categorical data dimensions.
– We evaluate different features and combine less informative features
together to achieve high detection effectiveness.
– We evaluate the anomalous user behavior detection system on a large
number of log files that belongs to a real enterprise.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
research background on anomaly detection and discusses related work.
Section 3 gives the implementation of our system. Section 4 describes the
experimental setting and reports evaluation results. Section 5 discusses
future directions and concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Anomaly user behavior detection techniques are designed to identify rare
user behavior that are outliers to the normal behavior or behaviors that
changed or carried by other users. These techniques can be categorized
into three modes, supervised anomaly detection, semi-supervised anomaly
detection and unsupervised anomaly detection.
The supervised anomaly detection requires a set of labeled training
data, normal or anomalous, to educate the detection software and create a
predictive model of normal versus anomalous behavior. Once a new action
is coming, the predictive model is applied to classify the new action.
Examples of such approaches include support vector machines [1] and
Bayesian networks [2]. The problem with the supervised approach is that
the system can only detect anomalies that conform with its model due to
the lack of anomaly instances. A truly novel anomaly event may escape
detection, as the training data contains no archetype for it. Additionally,
huge effort required in labeling training data and human error in labeling
will influence all future analysis.
Semi-supervised anomaly detection has the advantage of only requir-
ing labeling for normal data within the training set. This works well for
scenarios where anomaly types are difficult to predict, but ‘normal’ is
easy to define. In this mode, an anomaly is anything which lies outside
of the normal labeled data. Semi-Supervised has the benefit of reducing
the level of manual effort required to label the training data, as anoma-
lies need not be tagged. This mode also has the benefit of being able to
detect novel events, as again, anything not-normal is anomalous. Semi-
supervised has difficulties when presented with noisy data sets. As noise
may be distributed across the sample space, much of it may fall outside
of the regions defined as normal, and hence this data will be declared
anomalous and a high false-positive rate will result.
Unsupervised anomaly detection approach has the significant advan-
tage of not requiring labeled training data. It operates on the assumption
that normal data instances are the most common within the data set.
Anomalies are rare. There may be other determining factors, such as clus-
tering: normal data will congregate in large, dense clusters and anomalies
occupy isolated positions within the data set. Unsupervised mode can be
better at detecting novel events and can also recalibrate its definition of
normal, should the normal-state within the input data evolve over time.
Past work has also explored unsupervised learning for anomaly user be-
havior detection [3,4]. Cook [5], Eberle [6] and Yan [7] represent threat
and non-threat data as a graph and apply unsupervised learning to de-
tect anomalies. Our work focus on unsupervised approach. We represent
user behaviour by combining features together and apply Isolation Forest
algorithm [8], to build an automatic anomaly user detection system.
3 Methodology
In this paper, we develop an automatic anomalous user detection system
using an extended version of the Isolation Forest algorithm. The proposed
framework is shown in Figure 1. The parser pre-processes all log files and
stores logs by users. For each user, the system extracts the features set and
builds a baseline user model by creating a collection of extended Isolation
Forest tree. When a new user record is coming, it is mapped into each
of these Isolation Forest trees and an anomaly score is calculated. If its
anomaly score is under the threshold, it is assumed normal, otherwise, an
anomalous behavior is recorded and this user is flagged as anomalous.
Fig. 1: The proposed framework
3.1 Isolation Forest
Isolation forest (iForest) [8] is an anomaly detection algorithm. The algo-
rithm utilises the observation that if a dataset is organised into a binary
search tree, anomalies are more likely to be inserted at a lesser depth
in a tree, compared to non-anomalous values (see Figure 2). For a given
dataset, the algorithm takes n random samples of size m. For each ran-
dom sample, a binary search tree is constructed, randomly selecting a
dimension and partition point for each comparison node in the tree. To
calculate the anomaly score of a new data point, it is inserted into each of
the n random trees. The anomaly score is derived from the mean insertion
depth across all of the trees.
Isolation forest has a number of advantages as an anomaly detection
algorithm:
– It requires relatively small samples from large datasets to derive an
anomaly detection function. This makes it fast and scalable.
– It does not require example anomalies in the training data set.
– Its distance threshold for determining anomalies is based on tree
depth, which is independent of the scaling of the data set dimensions.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: (a) In this example dataset, a randomly constructed binary search tree isolates
the anomalous value (17,17) (shown in red) in just one division, whereas the medoid
value (7,13) (shown in blue) is isolated in five random divisions. (b) The anomaly has
a tree depth of 1, compared to 5 for the medoid point.
3.2 Extended Isolation Forest to categorical data
Isolation forest was originally proposed for datasets with continuous di-
mensions. In this paper we extend the algorithm to consider categorical
data. Our method only requires that for each categorical dimension, val-
ues have an ordering. The ordering may be arbitrary. Each value is then
mapped to a numeric value, based on its ordering.
For example the values true and false may be mapped to false = 0,
true = 1.
Having mapped the categorical values to numeric values, the categor-
ical dimensions can be treated the same way as the numeric dimensions
in the iForest algorithm.
3.3 Features Extraction
The original format of the log files has a total of 42 fields. Some fields
are missing in the dataset, such as location information. In this paper, we
explore five fields. They are listed below.
Match Rule The match rule is the rule used in the system for match
authentication. 8 predefined rules for all logs are listed below and their
distribution is shown in Figure 3.
– DEVICEIDCHECK
– DEVICEVELOCITY
– USER DEVICE ASSOCIATED AND DEVICE MFP MATCHED
– USER DEVICE ASSOCIATED AND DEVICE MFP NOT MATCHED
– USER DEVICE NOT ASSOCIATED AND DEVICE MFP MATCHED
– USER DEVICE NOT ASSOCIATED AND DEVICE MFP NOT MATCHED
– USERVELOCITY
– USERKNOWN
Signature Check This field is the information on whether the device
signature matched with the incoming device ID. If it matches, the status
is “Y”. Otherwise, it is “N”. If a Device Check’s value is YN or YY, this
field can only be Y.
Device Check This field checks whether the device is associated with
the user. There are three values, NN, YN and YY. NN means that there
is no device id on the device. Either we are seeing this device for the first
time or the user deleted cookies. YN means that the device id has been
read but it is not associated with the user. It is a known device and a
Fig. 3: The histogram of Match Rules
new user, either because this is a shared device or because the user has
tried access before but did not successfully authenticate themselves and
complete the transaction. YY means device is associated with the user.
Browser This is the browser on which the user logged. This information
does not exist as a separate field in the original dataset but can be ex-
tracted from the Device Signature field in the log during the pre-process
period. There are 8 browsers have been detected. The details of them are
listed in Figure 4. The most popular browser is Microsoft Internet Ex-
plorer that has more than 19 million logs, followed by Chrome that has
more than 3.5 million logs. The three least popular browsers are Opera,
SeaMonkey and PSP. Each of them has just over 100 logs.
Fig. 4: The histogram of Browsers
Log Time This is the Date/Time in GMT that the transaction was
evaluated. The original format of timestamps is “mm/dd/yyyy H:M:S”
or “mm/dd/yy H:M:S”. We extract two time information from it in this
research. They are date of the week and hour of the day.
4 Experimental Results
Experiments have been carried out to compare the performances of system
using both single feature and combined features. For evaluation purpose
in this research, for a specific user, we assume all logs of this user are
normal and all logs of other users are anomalous for this user. Using this
classification, we measure the detection effectiveness. In the real system,
once the user model has been built, any testing log with an anomaly score
over the threshold will be reported as anomalous.
4.1 Data Sets
All experiments have been carried out on a real enterprise dataset, CA
RiskMinder user payroll access logs. This dataset contains a total of
25,991,654 logs, covering a total of 89 days over 14 weeks starting from
15/02/2014.
Each log in the file contains 42 fields. Some sample fields with possible
values are listed in Figure 5
Fig. 5: The sample fields of the dataset
These logs are from 332,672 users. The histogram of user access fre-
quency is shown in Figure 6. As we can seen, except a small amount
of users accessed the system very frequently with over 10,000 accesses,
most users only accessed a few hundreds times to the system. This re-
search select all users that have access frequency between 501 and 600
and build a user model for each of these users. There are total of 495
users with 267,762 logs in the selected range. We select this range be-
cause there is a reasonable amount of users in this range and these logs
contain information that is sufficient for testing. We assume that most
high frequently access users might be bots and most low frequently ac-
cess users don’t provide enough information. During the testing stage, we
randomly select logs from the whole dataset and calculate their anomaly
scores against each user model.
Fig. 6: The histogram of user access frequency
4.2 Evaluation Metrics
When comparing the performance of different classification techniques, it
is important to assess how well a classification model is able to correctly
assign records to the actual classes. Several metrics are conventionally in
use to numerically quantify the effectiveness of classification performance.
To introduce the metrics, let us define that for a class yj , a record is
positive if it is predicted to belong this specific class and is negative if
it is predicted to belong other classes. Suppose that for a test set with
n records, the set of positive records and negative records for the class
are known (for example, as the result of human judgment), and P and
N are the number of positive records and negative records respectively,
n = P +N . Using four important counts [9] defined below, P = TP +FN
and N = FP + TN .
– TP represents the true positives which is the number of positive
records correctly identified as specific class.
– FP represents the false positives, the number of negative records which
do not belong to the class but were incorrectly identified as it.
– TN represents the true negatives which refers the number of negative
records correctly identified as other classes.
– FN represents the false negatives, that is the number of positive
records which belong to the class but were incorrectly identified as
other classes.
Confusion Matrix The confusion matrix provides information needed
to determine how well a classification model performs. In Table 1, clas-
sification results of two classes, A and B, are listed in a 2x2 confusion
matrix. For the testing set of total n = a + b + c + d records, class A
includes P = a+ b positive records and N = c+ d negative records while
TP = a ; FP = c ; TN = d ; and FN = b.
Similarly, class B contains P = c + d positive records and N = a + b
negative records while
TP = d ; FP = b ; TN = a ; and FN = c.
Predicted Class
Class A B
Actual
Class
A a b
B c d
Table 1: Confusion matrix for for a binary classification problem
One-dimensional Measures In addition to the confusion matrix, some
single-figure measures of effectiveness have been developed. In many cases,
these single measures are more attractive because of their compactness.
In this paper, we used five single measures, namely true positive rate
(TPrate), false positive rate (FPrate), precision,recall and Accuracy .
They are calculated [9] as:
TPrate =
TP
P
=
TP
TP + FN
FPrate =
FP
N
=
FP
FP + TN
(1)
and
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FN + FP + TN
(2)
4.3 Comparison of Results
Experiments were carried out to evaluate our approach. In the dataset,
there are over 26 million logs from over 330 thousands users. As we dis-
cussed before, we select users who have 501-600 access logs. In total, there
are 495 users.
Comparison of systems on classifying users In this study, we com-
pare 7 detection systems. All systems implement the extended Isolation
Forest Algorithm but use different feature sets. There are 5 basic features
are selected for the study, namely Match Rule, Signature Check, Device
Check, Browser and Log Time. The detail of these features are discussed
in Section 3.3. In summary, System 1-5 use a single basic feature, System
6 and 7 are based on combined feature set: System 6 combines the first
four basic features; System 7 combines all basic features.
For each system, it runs 10 times on all selected 495 users. In each
run, for each user, all records are randomly partitioned into two sets, 100
records as the test set and the rest as the training set. The training set is
used to build the Isolation Forest tree as the baseline user model. During
the testing period, another 100 records are randomly selected from the
whole dataset except this user’s. So the test set has a total of 200 records
and consists two parts, 100 records classified as this user and 100 records
classified as the others. All testing logs are mapped into the Isolation
Forest tree and then a anomaly score will be calculated for each one. If
the score is high than the threshold, this record is anomaly. The threshold
in this research is set at 0.80. If the anomalous record belongs to this user,
it is regarded as a False Negative. Otherwise, it is a True Negative.
In each run, the mean value of 495 users’ effectiveness is calculated
and the overall performance of each system is calculated as the average
of 10 random runs. The summary of the different systems’ performance
is shown in Table 2.
Packer TP rate FP rate Precision Recall Accuracy
System 1: Single feature Match Rule 99.08% 98.38% 50.18% 99.08% 50.35%
System 2: Single feature Signature Check 99.78% 99.08% 50.18% 99.78% 50.35%
System 3: Single feature Device Check 99.91% 99.75% 50.04% 99.91% 50.08%
System 4: Single feature Browser 99.80% 94.03% 52.11% 99.80% 52.88%
System 5: Single feature Time 99.46% 98.54% 50.24% 99.46% 50.46%
System 6: Combined 4 features 99.02% 94.85% 51.43% 99.02% 52.08%
System 7: Combined 4 features + time 98.92% 97.50% 50.50% 98.92% 50.77%
Table 2: Detailed detection results using single feature or combined features
Though the combined feature system has slightly better performance
than the single feature system, the results show that all tested systems
could not distinguish behaviors carried by different users. This is because
most features are extracted from categorical data that has very small
variants. As presented in Figure 3 and 4, the counts of some feature values
of match rules and browsers are extreme high that means most users have
similar feature sets. It is hard to use Isolation Forest algorithm to isolate
anomaly values.
Detecting anomalous user behavior It is noted that there are logs
with high anomaly score detected from both user and others. So the de-
tails of each run are examined more closely. Figure 7 gives the histogram
of the number of anomalous logs of all 495 users within one run using the
system 6 described as above. 258 out of 495 users don’t have any anoma-
lous behavior, followed by 122 users have only one anomalous behavior,
such as change the browser or the match rule.
An output of one user run is shown in Figure 8. As we can see, there
are two anomalous records for user 58376 in this run. An example feature
sets of this user’s normal and abnormal behavior are listed in Table 3, In
this table, the first two rows report two anomalous behavior.
Fig. 7: The histogram of false positive value of 495 users using a combined 4 features
detection system. A false positive indicates an anomalous behavior of this user.
Fig. 8: Anomaly scores of 100 records for user58376. It is noted that there are two
false positive instances.
5 Conclusions
We have demonstrated that isolation forest is an effective algorithm for
detecting anomalous user behaviour. Our method does not require any
example anomalies in the training data. In this paper we propose a sim-
ple method for extending the isolation forest algorithm to data sets which
include categorical dimensions. Our application of our method to an enter-
prise dataset showed promising results. Our experiments tested whether
we could accurately distinguish between the behaviour patterns of differ-
ent users. Using five principal features from our dataset we obtained a
recall of approximately 98.92%. We are able to detect anomalous behavior
carried out by the user. We noted that access time is a significant feature,
Log No Match Rule Signature Device Browser Anomaly Score
12303841 4 1 3 2 0.9307
4745560 4 1 3 1 0.9307
24592463 3 2 3 5 0.4742
2399302 3 2 3 1 0.4118
18966962 3 2 3 5 0.4742
9829951 3 2 3 1 0.4118
11434417 3 2 3 1 0.4118
Table 3: Two anomalous behavior and five normal behavior for user 58376
as users have different patterns of when they usually access the system.
In this work we considered each access as an individual event. Future
work will try to improve the overall accuracy by considering sequences of
events.
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